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In late September the Risk Man-agement Agency (RMA) of USDA released the results of commis-
sioned studies that calculated the 
rate of return that U.S. crop insur-
ance companies have received from 
selling multi-peril crop insurance 
(MPCI) (http://www.rma.usda.gov/
pubs/2009/millimanhistoricalrate.
pdf). Since 2000, the average annual 
rate of return on equity has been 19 
percent. The study also estimated 
that a reasonable rate of return over 
the same time period for this line of 
business would be about 11 percent. 
One straightforward interpretation 
of this difference is that since 2000, 
the crop insurance industry has 
received a rate of return that is 72 
percent higher than what would be 
needed to induce private companies 
to participate in the crop insurance 
program. 
The insurance industry dis-
agrees with this assessment of prof-
itability. In a report released in early 
October (http://www.ag-risk.org/
NCISPUBS/SpecRPTS/GrantThornton/
Grant_Thornton_Report-2009_FINAL.
pdf ) the industry argues that “the 
MPCI program is not as profi table 
as the P&C (Property and Casualty) 
industry and writing MPCI entails 
greater risk.” Clearly there is a differ-
ence of opinion here. 
Arguments over the profi tability 
of the crop insurance industry are 
to be expected and have occurred 
often. An arm of government, be 
it the Government Accountability 
Offi ce (GAO) or the RMA, releases 
a report that fi nds excess industry 
profi ts. The industry responds with 
arguments about the fl awed account-
ing standards used by government 
analysts and then releases its own 
report that allows it to argue that 
it cannot absorb any cuts in the 
taxpayer subsidies that it receives 
because the industry is already 
undercompensated. 
What should Congress con-
clude? Should members and their 
staff believe the industry reports 
that further cuts will reduce indus-
try profi ts to the point at which 
companies will not be willing to par-
ticipate in the program? Or should 
they believe the GAO and RMA 
reports that conclude that substan-
tial cuts can be made because the 
industry is overcompensated? 
Although economists are often 
maligned for their lack of ability to 
be precise in offering prescriptions 
for what ails the economy, their con-
cepts and analytical tools can often 
give insights into competing argu-
ments. An examination of how the 
crop insurance industry operates 
and competes provides a simple 
and reasonably accurate measure of 
the amount of excess profi ts the in-
dustry receives. This measure esti-
mates that industry subsidies could 
be reduced by more than a billion 
dollars without adverse impacts on 
program effectiveness.
Revenue and Costs in the 
Insurance Industry
Insurance companies obtain rev-
enue from premiums paid by their 
customers and obtain additional 
revenue from invested capital. This 
revenue must cover claims paid 
out, the cost of adjusting claims, 
any cost of reinsurance, as well as 
other overhead costs such as sala-
ries. Profi ts are positive when total 
revenue exceeds total costs. The big 
difference between the crop insur-
ance industry and unsubsidized 
insurance industries is that about 
80 percent of the premium revenue 
that would be paid by customers is 
actually paid by taxpayers. This 80 
percent number consists of the 60 
percent of premiums that are paid 
by taxpayers and the 20 percent ex-
pense reimbursement. In addition, 
taxpayers provide crop insurance 
companies subsidized reinsurance 
in exchange for the requirement 
that the companies must sell insur-
ance to all farmers in areas in which 
they do business.
That such a large portion of pre-
mium is paid by taxpayers height-
ens the importance of determining 
whether the RMA report of a 72 per-
cent excessive rate of return does, 
in fact, accurately describe the cur-
rent situation. 
Competition in the Crop 
Insurance Industry
In most lines of insurance, as with 
most other industries, companies 
compete on the quality of their 
product and on price. This compe-
tition is what keeps industry profi t 
levels from getting too far above or 
2           CENTER FOR AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT                                FALL 2009
Iowa Ag Review
ISSN 1080-2193
http://www.card.iastate.edu
Iowa Ag Review is a quarterly newsletter published by the 
Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD). This 
publication presents summarized results that emphasize the 
implications of ongoing agricultural policy analysis, analysis 
of the near-term agricultural situation, and discussion of agri-
cultural policies currently under consideration.
Editorial Staff
Sandra Clarke
Managing Editor
Becky Olson
Publication Design
Iowa State University
Iowa State University does not discriminate on the basis of race, 
color, age, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, gender 
identity, sex, marital status, disability, or status as a U.S. vet-
eran. Inquiries can be directed to the Director of Equal Opportu-
nity and Diversity, 3680 Beardshear Hall, 515-294-7612.
Editor
Bruce A. Babcock
CARD Director
CARD, Iowa State University, 578 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 
50011-1070; Ph: 515-294-1183; Fax: 515-294-6336; E-mail: 
card-iaagrev@iastate.edu; 
Web site: www.card.iastate.edu.
Articles may be reprinted with permission and with appro-
priate attribution. Contact the managing editor at the above 
e-mail or call 515-294-6257.
Printed with soy ink
IN THIS ISSUE
Examining the Health of the
U.S. Crop Insurance Industry ........ 1
Drought Tolerance and Risk
in the U.S. Crop Insurance
Program ............................................ 4
Recent CARD Publications ............. 8
End of a Long Run ........................... 9
below the levels needed to keep the 
industry viable. But, as discussed in 
the accompanying article on page 
4, RMA has the responsibility of set-
ting premium rates. In addition, its 
governing board, the Federal Crop 
Insurance Corporation, determines 
which products companies can of-
fer. Thus all crop insurance compa-
nies sell the same products at the 
same price. 
Companies do compete, how-
ever. Those companies that are best 
at using the government-provided 
reinsurance make more money 
than others. In addition, companies 
compete with each other for market 
share by competing for crop insur-
ance agents’ books of business. All 
crop insurance policies must be 
sold by crop insurance agents. Most 
agents are independent so they can 
route their policies through any of 
the crop insurance companies that 
service policies in their regions. 
Agents are more likely to offer their 
books of business to the highest 
bidder. Thus competition for market 
share is conducted in terms of agent 
commissions. Those companies that 
pay higher commissions will tend to 
increase their market share.
Price as an Indicator of Profi ts
In a competitive market, profi ts will 
accrue to the factors of production 
that are limited in supply. In profes-
sional baseball, increases in revenue 
typically show up in infl ated salaries 
to star players because they are in 
limited supply and owners compete 
for their services. In farming, an 
increase in the price of crops tends 
to increase land rents because there 
is only so much land to go around. 
In economic terms, the factor that is 
most limited in supply is the residu-
al claimant of any excess profi ts to 
an industry.
In the crop insurance industry, 
though, as mentioned earlier, the 
only price that refl ects competi-
tion among companies is the price 
they pay agents for their books of 
business. Thus a good measure of 
the degree of excessive taxpayer 
compensation to the industry is to 
look at the only price in the indus-
try—the agent commission—that 
is free to adjust. If compensation to 
the industry is excessive, then we 
should see the price paid to agents 
for their books of business increase 
as companies seek to expand. If 
compensation to the industry is too 
low, then we should see the price 
paid to agents drop as companies 
attempt to cut their losses. 
Agent Commissions
Figure 1 shows one measure of 
agent commission. Although agent 
commission rates have increased 
from just below 16 percent to about 
17 percent of total premium, there is 
no obvious evidence in Figure 1 that 
agent commissions have been bid 
up in response to excessive profi ts 
in the industry.
However, the cost of selling 
and servicing a crop insurance 
policy and running a crop insur-
ance agency is not proportionate to 
the amount of premium collected. 
In crop insurance, a farmer’s pre-
mium will double if the price of 
the insured crop doubles. But the 
cost of servicing the policy will be 
constant. A better measure of agent 
commissions is the dollar amount of 
commission paid per policy sold. As 
shown in Figure 2, commission re-
ceived per policy sold has increased 
by a factor of almost four. 
One measure of the extent to 
which the industry is overcompen-
sated is the difference between the 
minimum amount agents would ac-
cept to sell crop insurance policies 
and the amount that they currently 
receive. This measure assumes 
that all other factors in the crop 
insurance industry, such as staff or 
executive salaries, are paid a com-
petitive amount. An overestimate of 
the minimum amount of compensa-
tion required to sell crop insurance 
policies is the amount received 
in 2001. This is an over-estimate 
because there was no shortage of 
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agents willing to sell crop insurance 
in 2001, which implies that this 
amount gave them a good return on 
their labor.
Of course, we should increase 
this 2001 amount by general wage 
infl ation to refl ect the prevailing 
increase in wage rates. If we make 
this adjustment, then the minimum 
amount of compensation needed 
in 2008 to induce crop insurance 
agents to provide the same level 
of service that they provided in 
2001 is $426 per policy. The actual 
compensation was $1,442. Thus, 
the amount by which agents were 
able to increase their compensation 
because of increased profi ts of the 
crop insurance companies in 2008 
was $1,015 per policy. 
There were 1.148 million poli-
cies sold in 2008. So an estimate of 
the amount of excessive compensa-
tion that crop insurance companies 
receive from taxpayers is $1.165 
billion ($1,015 per policy multiplied 
by 1.148 million polices). More spe-
cifi cally, if taxpayer subsidies to the 
crop insurance industry had been 
$1.165 billion lower in 2008, then 
the level of service that existed in 
2001 would have existed in 2008. 
And, as stated earlier, this estimate 
of the amount of excess compensa-
tion to the industry is too low if the 
salaries of other personnel involved 
with the industry increased faster 
than industry norms.
It is diffi cult to compare this 
$1.165 billion estimate of over-
compensation with the 72 percent 
excessive rate of return estimate 
made in the RMA report because of 
different methods used. But these 
two estimates are clearly consis-
tent with an overall conclusion that 
taxpayer support of the U.S. crop 
insurance industry is excessive. To 
better reconcile different estimates 
of whether subsidies are too high or 
too low, government analysts could 
make a simple adjustment: remove 
agent commissions as an unavoid-
able cost of business. As explained, 
agent commissions are determined 
by the level of subsidies provided to 
the industry. Only the level of com-
mission that would induce agents to 
quit the crop insurance business is 
an unavoidable expense. 
Ways to Cut (But Is There a Will?)
Industry revenue from underwriting 
gains and expense reimbursement 
totaled $3.2 billion in 2008. Thus, a 
cut of $1.165 billion would have left 
the industry with about $2 billion 
in revenue. The two ways that this 
amount of money could be reduced 
is a combination of a reduction in av-
erage underwriting gains along with 
a change in the way that expense 
reimbursements are calculated. 
Underwriting gains, though, 
give companies incentives to police 
fraud in the program. But RMA 
could increase the amount of un-
derwriting gains that companies 
give back to the agency in years in 
which there are gains (the quota 
share) in exchange for the agency 
taking on more of the losses in loss 
years—which would cut average 
taxpayer costs. 
To cut expense reimbursement, 
RMA could pay companies a fl at 
amount per policy, say $426 per 
policy. This would amount to about 
$500 million per year to pay agent 
Figure 1. Agent commissions as a percentage of total premium
Source: Table 5.1 of Grant Thornton report for National Crop Insurance Services, 
October 2, 2009.
Figure 2. Commissions received per U.S. crop insurance policy sold
Continued on page 8
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commissions. Then RMA could add 
in so much per policy for claims ad-
justment and so much per policy for 
salaries and other overhead. 
The chances that Congress will 
soon embrace a cut in funding for a 
program that has generated 20 per-
cent annual salary growth for crop 
insurance agents who reside in rural 
areas seems pretty remote. After 
all, Congress and the administration 
are currently borrowing money to 
create jobs to keep unemployment 
down. But eventually, borrowed 
money has to be paid back. And the 
only way to pay back money is to 
raise taxes or cut expenditures. But 
there are economic costs associated 
with raising tax revenue, so federal 
programs should be scrutinized for 
effi ciency. In agriculture, the place 
to start is the crop insurance pro-
gram. There is no doubt the same 
level of service can be provided to 
farmers at much lower cost. ◆
are calculated as a proportion of pre-
miums. This drop in expense reim-
bursement could be lower if farmers 
responded to a premium decrease by 
buying more expensive coverage. 
In addition, a drop in premium 
rates would increase loss ratios, 
which would decrease underwrit-
ing gains. Because taxpayers do not 
benefi t as much from underwriting 
gains as they lose when there are 
underwriting losses, such a change 
would likely benefi t taxpayers. Thus, 
taxpayers and farmers would likely 
be net winners from an adjustment to 
crop insurance premiums to account 
for increasing drought tolerance.
A Full Accounting
The efforts of biotechnology com-
panies seem to have paid off in an 
unanticipated manner by making 
corn hybrids better able to with-
stand drought conditions. Modern, 
herbicide-resistant soybeans also 
seem, for more enigmatic reasons, to 
have increasing drought resistance. 
In addition, both crops are being 
managed by larger and perhaps 
more able managers. And better 
management leads to more timely 
fi eld operations, which could result 
in increasing drought tolerance.
The large impacts of this newly 
evident drought tolerance in corn and 
soybeans may be dwarfed if seed com-
panies are in fact successful in their 
targeted efforts to reduce yield losses 
due to drought. As new technologies 
Drought Tolerance and Risk in the U.S. 
Crop Insurance Program
Continued from page 7
become available, it is important that 
the crop insurance industry and Risk 
Management Agency alter the way 
they determine crop insurance rates 
so the system can directly refl ect the 
lower risks.
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